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The Parameters of the
Right to Counsel
and
Its Application in Civil
Contempt Proceedings
by Joseph Bernstein

I. Parameters of the Right to

Counsel for the Accused in the
Prosecution of Any Criminal Offense.
The modem history of the right to
counsel began with Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335 (1963), which
overruled Betts v. Brady, 316 U.S. 455
(1942), and established the constitutional right to counsel for anyone prosecuted of a felony by a state. The Sixth
Amendment, which in enumerated situations has been made applicable to the
states by reason of the Fourteenth
Amendent, has recently been extended
to include the right to counsel whenever
the possibility of incarceration exists,
whether the offense is classified as petty,
misdemeanor or felony. Argersinger v.
Hamlin, 407 U.S. 25 (1972). The question arises as to how far that doctrine will
be allowed to expand.
The right to the assistance of counsel
for one accused of any criminal offense
where the possibility of incarceration
exists is now guaranteed by the holding
in Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at
37. The petitioner, an indigent, was
charged in Florida with the offense of
carrying a concealed weapon. Such offense was punishable by imprisonment
up to six-months and a fine of one
thousand dollars. At his trial before a
judge, the petitioner was unrepresented
by counsel. After being sentenced to 90
days in jail, the petitioner sought his release under habeas corpus proceedings.
The Florida Supreme Court denied his
appeal and held that the right to courtappointed counsel, as was provided in
Duncan v. Louisiana, 391 U.S. 145
(1968), extended only to trials "for nonpetty offenses punishable by more than six
months imprisonment." 407 U.S., at 27.

The Supreme Court reversed the
Florida courts. In ruling on the right to
counsel, the Court stated that "[tlhe assistance of counsel is often a requisite to
the very existence of a fair trial." 407
U.S., at 31. The Sixth Amendment's
"requirement of counsel may well be
necessary to a fair trial even in a pettyoffense prosecution. We are by no
means convinced that legal and constitutional questions involved in a case that
actually leads to imprisonment even for
a brief period are any less complex than
when a person can be sent off for six
months or more." 407 U.S., at 33. And,
in discussing guilty pleas, the Court said,
"[cl ounsel is needed so that the accused
may know precisely what he is doing, so
that he is fully aware of the prospect of
going to jail or in prison, and so that he is
treated fairly by the prosecution." 407
U.S., at 34.
The holding inArgersinger v. Hamlin,
supra, was even held applicable retroactively in Berry v. Cincinnatti, 414 U.S.
29 (1973). The Supreme Court held that
persons convicted of misdemeanors
prior to the U.S. Supreme Court decision in Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra,
were entitled to the Constitutional rule
enunciated there " .. .if they allege and
prove a bona fide, existing case or controversy sufficient to invoke the jurisdiction of a federal court." 414 U.S., at
29-30.
Argersinger v. :-famlin, supra, has
been consistently followed in all subsequent Supreme Court cases to date,
except for the distinguishing remarks in
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778
(1973). Taken at its face value, the holding in Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, may
have been thought to place a limitation
on the guarantees to assistance of counsel for one who might be thrown into jail.
Specifically, " ... the need for counsel
must be made on a case-by-case basis in
the exercise of a sound discretion by the
state authority charged with responsibility for administering the probation and
parole system." 411 U. S., at 790. But, if
this was designed to limit the expansion
of the Argersinger doctrine, why was it
not specifically so started? In fact, the
Gagon v. Scarpelli Court only mentioned the Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra,
case twice, both at 411 U.S., at 788.

The factual setting in Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, supra, seems to proVide the
answer. The respondent, Gerald Scarpelli, pleaded guilty in July, 1965, to a
charge of armed robbery in Wisconsin.
He was sentenced by the trial judge to
serve fifteen years in prison, but was
placed on probation for seven years in
lieu of imprisonment. The next month
respondent was arrested by the Illinois
police in the course of a burglary of a
house. He admitted his guilt after being
informed of his constitutional rights. The
respondent's probation was revoked by
the Wisconsin probation authorities
without a hearin~ and, thereafter, the
respondent started to serve the fifteen
years to which he had been sentenced
by the trial judge. No hearing was affored to the respondent during the entire
probation revocation process. 411 U.S.,
at 778-780. The Supreme Court held
this to be an error, 411 U.S., at 782, as
did the Court of Appeals and the District
Court, 411 U.S., at 780.
But, the appointment of counsel for
an indigent probationer was decided differently by the Supreme Court than in
the lower federal courts. The Supreme
Court said, " ... the Court of Appeals
erred in accepting respondent's contention that the State is under a constitutional duty to provide counsel for indigents in all probation or parole revocation cases." 411 U.S., at 787. A caseby-case approach was considered
necessary to determine the necessity of
counsel for indigent probationers or
parolees. 411 U.S., at 790. The Supreme Court's reasoning in denying respondent the right to the assistance of
counsel was based on the differences between a criminal trial and a probation or
parole revocation hearing. "[Wle deal
here not with the right of an accused to
counsel in a criminal prosecution, but
with the more limited due process right
of one who is a probationer or parolee
only because he has been convicted of a
crime." 411 U.S., at 789. The case-bycase approach to the appointment of
counsel was therefore limited to the revocation hearing and is not a limitation
on the right to the assistance of counsel
for an accused at his trial.
The Gagnon v. Scarpelli Court placed
greater emphasis in two other probation
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or parole revocation cases, Mempa v.
Rhay, 389 U.S. 128 (1967) and
Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471
(1972), than it did in Argersinger v.
Hamlin, supra. The rights of the probationer or parolee at a revocation hearing were seen to be sufficiently different
from the rights of an accused who is
standing trial for the first time. Assuredly
the Fourteenth Amendment's requirements of "due process of law" apply in
favor of probationers and parolees at revocation hearings, as well as in cases of
persons standing trial for the first time.
But, different due process rights are afforded at revocation hearings and at
trials. For instance, the right of counsel
for a probationer at his revocation hearing is not always assured "".where the
probationer was sentenced at the time of
trial." Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S., at
781. And,

"".no person may be imprisoned
for any offense, whether classified
as petty, misdemeanor, or felony,
unless he was represented by
counsel at his trial."
Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 37.
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, and
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, both consider the concept of loss of freedom due
to incarceration. Their conclusions are at
variance with respect to the right of assistance of counsel, as demonstrated
supra, but the idea of loss of freedom is
not dispensed with. As is pointed out in
Gagnon, "[plrobation revocation, like
parole revocation, is not a stage of a
criminal prosecution, but does result in a
loss of liberty." 411 U.S., at 782. Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, states emphatically that the rationale of Powell v.
Alabama, 287 U.S. 45 (1932), and of
Gideon v. Wainwright, 372 U.S. 335
(1963), have "relevance to any criminal
trial, where an accused is deprived of his
liberty." 407 U.S., at 32. Thereafter, at
37, theArgersingerv. Hamlin, supra, ruling is extended to the deprivation of liberty for any criminal offense. No mention is made of what rights may be afforded to one who is susceptible to the
loss of liberty, but who just happens to
be charged with a civil offense.
As the remainder of this memorandum will point out, there seems to be a
total disregard as to the constitutional
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right to the assistance of counsel when
the accused is charged under a civil contempt statute.

II. The Loss of Liberty Potential
in Civil Contempt Actions Should Allow
the Alleged Contemnor to Have the
Right to the Assistance of Counce!.
The law of contempt is largely
judge-made law, and indeed judges and
legislators have spoken of the "inherent" powers of the judiciary to punish
for contempt even when legislative regulations have been contrary. See Dobbs,
Contempt of Courl: A Survey, 56 Cornell L. Rev. 183, 185 (1971); Adkins,
Code Revision in Maryland: The Courts
and Judicial Proceedings Arlicle, 34 Md.
L. Rev. 7, 13 (1974). Contempt of court
has been described as an offense against
the state, rather than against the judge
personally, which is punishable because
of the necessity of maintaining the dignity of and respect toward the court and
their decrees. 17 Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt
§ 2. The power to punish for contempt is
exercised to vindicate the court's dignity
for disrespect shown to it or its orders, or
to compel the performance of some
order or decree whose performance is
within the power of the contemnor. 17
Am. Jur. 2d, Contempt § 2. One of the
penalties which may be imposed for contempt of court, whether characterized as
civil or criminal, is the incarceration of
the offending party.
The reasoning ofArgersinger v. Hamlin, supra, in which the Court stated that
"absent a knowing and intelligent
waiver, no person may be imprisoned
for any offense, whether classified as
petty, misdemeanor, or felony, unles he
was represented by counsel at his trial,"
may have an application not only to the
rights of an indigent charged with a misdemeanor (the issue in that case), but also
to the rights of persons, whether indigent
or not, charged with contempt of court.
Since the contemnor may be deprived of
his liberty in contempt proceedings, several courts have stated that he is entitled to
minimal due process and equal protection
rights, among which is the right to counsel.
SeeIn re Grand Jury, 468 F. 2d 1368 (9th
Cir. 1972); Application of Shelly, 197 Cal.

App. 2d 199,16 Cal. Rptr. 916 (1961);Ex
parte Davis, 161 Tex. 561, 344 S.w. 2d
153 (1961); Ex parte Hosken, 480 S.w.
2d 18 (Tex. Civ. App. 1972). The Ninth
Circuit Court of Appeals observed in In
re Grand Jury Proceedings, supra, that
the threat of imprisonment is the coercion that makes a civil contempt proceeding effective, and that the civil label
did not obscure its penal nature. In that
case an indigent who was charged with
civil contempt for failing to answer federal grand jury questions pursuant to a
court order was held to be entitled to
court-appointed counsel in his contempt
hearing. In Application of Shelly, supra,
the court noted that a contempt proceeding arising out of a civil action was, in a
broad sense, regarded as a criminal proceeding. There the applicant was allowed to waive his right to counsel even
though he would have been afforded the
due process right to counsel. Observing
that a civil contempt hearing was quasicriminal in nature, the court in Ex parle
Davis, supra, required that adequate
time be furnished to one charged with
civil contempt in order that he obtain
representation by counsel in the contempt proceedings. In that case the contemnor failed to make support payments
required by a previous court order. And,
in Ex parle Hosken, supra, the court said
that contempt proceedings were often
considered criminal or quasi-criminal in
nature, and that a person faced with deprivation of liberty had the constitutional
right to be repsented by counse!'
It should be noted that while contempts are frequently classified as civil
or criminal, there is a fundamental dicotomi between the two. See Gompers
v. Bucks Stove & Range Co., 221 U.S.
418 (1911). As to the standards that are
used to distinguish civil from criminal
contempt actions, see Wright, et aI., Civil
and Criminal Contempt in the Federal
Courts, 17 F.R.D. 167 (1955); Beale,
Contempt of Courl, Criminal and Civil, 21
Harv. L. Rev. 161 (1908); Moskovitz,
Contempt of Injuctions, Civil and Criminal, 43 Colum. L. Rev. 780 (1943);
Note, Civil and Criminal Contempt in
the Federal Courts. 57 Yale L. J. 83
(1947). A criminal contempt proceeding
has almost all of the safeguards of a
normal criminal defendant. [The crimi-

nal contemnor may be pardoned. Ex
parte Grossman, 267 U.S. 87 (1925).
The state can not appeal from an acquittal. US. v. Bittner, 11 F.2d 93 (4th Cir.
1926). The defendant may refuse to testify. Cf. Michaelson v. US., 266 U.S. 42,
66 (1924). The defendant is presumed
to be innocent. Gompers v. Bucks Stove
& Range Co., 221 U.S. 418, 444
(1911).] Whereas, the civil contemnor
has only the rights of any civil litigant.
See Green v. US., 356 U.S. 165, 197
(1958) (Black, J., dissenting). [For instance, the civil contemnor is not entitled
to a Fifth Amendment right to refuse to
testify. American Pastry Products Corp.
v. United Products Corp., 39 F.2d 181,
183 (D. Mass. 1930). He is not favored
by a presumption of innocence. CocaCola Co. u. Feulner, 7 F. Supp. 364
(S.D. Tex. 1934). Also, since confinement may continue until the civil contemnor complies or purges himself (See
Gompers v. Bucks Stove & Range Co.,
221 U.S. 418 (1911) ), the open-ened
sentence imposed on the civil contemnor theoretically can continue indefinitely and without the possibility of
executive pardon. In re NeVitt, 117 Fed.
448 (8th Cir. 1902).]
The obvious question thereby presents itself: Why should the civil contemnor not be entitled to the same rights as
the criminal contempt defendant? The
superficial answer to this question is that
civil contemnors do not need the
safeguards of criminal procedure or of
constitutional law because they "carry
the keys of their prison in their own
pocket." In re NeVitt, supra, at 461.
Judge Sanborn's rationalization in that
case has influenced the subsequent history of civil contempt in the United
States. Comment, The Coercive Function of Civil Contempt, 33 U. Chi. L.
Rev. 120, 125, n. 28 (1965). However,
civil contemnors may not actually carry
the keys in their pockets. Both compliance and inability to comply are complete defenses to coercive imprisonment
proceedings. Maggio v. Zeitz, 333 U.S.
56, 76 (1948); U.S. v. Jaeger, 117 F.2d
483 (2dCir. 1941). The contemnor may
have complied already or may be incap~
able of such action, yet the determination of these facts is made without certain
criminal safeguards even though impris-

onment hinges of the outcome of that
determination. Comment, The Coercive
Function of Civil Contempt, supra, at
125.
Another possible justification for differing between the rights of civil and
criminal contempt defendants rests on
the function of the civil contempt. Civil
contempt proceedings do not seek to
punish the defendant, but they are instituted to benefit the complaining party.
See US. v. UM. w., 330 U.S. 258
(1947); Gompers v. Bucks Stove &
Range Co., supra; MacNeil v. US., 236
F. 2d 149 (lstCir. 1956). And, granting
additional safeguards to the civil contemnor is directly opposed to the interests of the complainant, to whom the
contemnor owes a duty by reason of a
prior judicial decree. Imprisoning an individual, however, without traditional
criminal safeguards is against the spirit of
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, and Gideon v. Wainwright, supra.
The resolution of the above conflict
then would seem to require a balancing
of interests between the two parties to
the proceeding. Once a judgment on the

merits has been entered both parties
have already had their day in court, and
the threat of imprisonment is only used
to enforce compliance with that judgment. The contemnor faces imprisonment while the complainant wants to enforce his right to the prior judgment.
The right to enforce judgments is not
questioned here. However, the threat of
incarceration directed towards the alleged civil contemnor is such a drastic
step that modem notions of due process
and equal protection clearly require that
minimal criminal safeguards, such as the
right to counsel, be guaranteed. See
Powell v. Alabama, supra, at 68-69; Gideon v. Wainwright, supra, at 344;
Argersinger v. Hamlin, supra, at 40.
The threat of incarceration in a trial
setting should be enough, in itself, to activate the right to counsel requirement as
was mandated inArgersinger v. Hamlin,
supra. Even though a civil contempt
hearing is not deemed to be classified as
a criminal offense, such proceeding is
held in a courtroom and is presided over
by a trial judge. At the enforcement proceedings, some states, including Mary-
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land and New Jersy, even allow the
State's attorney to prosecute the contempt actions as though they were criminal case. See, e.g., Maryland Rules of
Procedure, Rule P4, §d(l) and the
Editor's note thereto. Thus, the power of
the court and of the state's prosecutorial
resources are set against the alleged contemnor in a trial setting.

"The assistance of counsel is often
a requisite to the very existence of
a fair tria\'''
Argersingerv. Hamlin, supra, at31. The
courts should not be so enamored with
the forms of actions that they lose sight of
their protection of one's constitutional
rights.
Two recent decisions have come to
opposite conclusions regarding the right
to counsel in civil contempt proceedings
brought to enforce previously adjudicated support orders: Duval v. Duval,
322 A. 2d 1 (N.H. 1974) and Otton v.
Zaborac, 525 P. 2d 537 (Alaska 1974).
The remainder of this section will discuss
the implications of these two cases.
In Otton v. Zaborac, supra, the appellant, a divorce, failed to make child support payments and was ordered to show
cause why he should not be held in contempt. At the contempt hearing, appellant was asked whether he wanted a jury
trial, but he was not advised of his right to
counsel. Appellant opted to be tried by
the judge, who held the appellant in contempt and jailed him. The Alaskan Supreme Court held "that an indigent in a
contempt for nonsupport proceeding
has a right to a court - appointed attorney." 525 P. 2d, at 538. The reasoning
for that decision was based on the availability of a jury trial in civil contempt
proceedings for nonsupport (Johansen
v. State, 491 P. 2d 759 (Alaska 1971) )
and on the seriousness of the potential
deprivation of liberty. The right to a jury
trial would have been a hollow right if the
appellant could not have been heard
through counsel. The court quoted from
Powell v. Alabama, supra, stating that

" '[t]he right to be heard by counsel would be, in many cases, of little avail if it did not comprehend
the right to be heard by counse!.'
287, U.S., at 68-69."
525 P. 2d, at 539. Also, the potential deprivation of liberty was a serious penal
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matter even though the contempt
charged was traditionally civil in nature,
and that imprisonment through the
courts was equal to "state action which
brings into play the due process clause."
525 P. 2d, at 538, 539.
Duval v. Duval, supra, concerns the
same factual setting in which a divorce
failed to make support payments and
was held in contempt of court. At the
contempt hearing, the defendant was
without the services of counsel. The
Supreme Court of New Hampshire
noted that "due process does not require the right to counsel in every instance where the possibility of incarceration exists, but depends instead on circumstances which show that the defendant would be treated unfairly if the assistance of counsel were not provided."
322 A. 2d, at 4. The court based its ruling
on Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra, Morrissey
v. Brewer, supra and Justice Powell's
concurring opinion in Argersinger v.
Hamlin. Without a transcript of the contempt hearing procided to them, the
court remanded the case to determine
"whether the issues presented below
were of a complex nature or whether the
defendant was without resources to obtain adequate representation without
substantial hardship to himself or his
family." 322 A, 2d, at 4. Also, the court
stated that theArgersinger right to counsel decision was "inapplicable to a civil
contempt action because that right is
confined to criminal proceedings." 322
A. 2d, at 3. The capability of the defendant to speak for himself, "the character
of the proceedings and the complexity of
the issues were all to be considered in
any civil contempt case where the right
to consel was sought. 322 A. 2d, at 3-4.
Both of these decisions are wellwritten, but their conclusions vary as
much as the Argersinger and Gagnon
cases. It should be noted that Otton v.
Zaborac, supra, never noted Gagnon v.
Scarpelli, supra. Equal emphasis should
show that Duval v. Duval, supra, lightly
glossed over the concept of state action
in the imprisonment of the contemnor.
In support of Otton v. Zaborac, supra,
the case of Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra,
does not need citing since the probation
revocation hearing involved there was
so dissimilar from a trial that different

due process protections were accorded
in each.

"[T]here are critical differences
between criminal trials and probation or parole revocation hearings, and both society and the
probationer or parolee have
stakes in preserving these differences."
Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. at 788789. At revocation hearings, "the state is
represented not by a prosecutor but by a
parole officer [who is concerned with rehabilitation]; formal procedures and
rules of evidence are not employed ....
The need for counsel at a revocation
hearing derives not from the invariable
attributes of those hearings but rather
from the pecularities of particular cases."
411 U.S., at 789. The probationer or
parolee has already been convicted at a
trial. Therefore, he has a more limited
due process right than does a criminal
defendant in a trial. As such, the civil
contemnor has more dissimilarities with
a probationer or parolee than with a
criminal defendant. All four parties stand
the possibility of incarceration, but
ONLY the civil contemnor has been denied the right to counsel at his trial.
The Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution provides that "[n]o
State shall ... deprive any person oLliberty ... without due process of law." Itis a
reasonable argument that imprisonment
to coerce compliance with a state court
action amounts to state action. As such,
a denial of due process should at least be
raised when the state provides the remedy of incarcerating a civil contemnor
to enforce his payment of a prior state
court support decree. It may be a personal remedy to the complainant, but
the state courts enforce the punishment
of the civil contemnor. Perhaps that is
how the Duval v. Duval court came to
deny counsel to certain civil contemnors:
The issue of state action may not have
been raised.
As stated, supra, the Duval court's reliance on Gagnon v. Scarpelli, supra,
may have been misdirected. The issue of
proViding counsel in a probation or
parole revocation hearing is not equivalent to providing counsel in a civil contempt trial. The probationer and parolee
have already had trials to determine their

guilt. They both have had the right to
counsel at their trials. Therefore, their
revocation hearings are nof used to determine guilt or innocence - that has already been determined at their trials.
On the other hand, a civil contemnor
needs the guidance of counsel even if he
will plead guilty to the charge of failing to
comply with a support order.
"Couns~lis needed so that the
accused may know precisely what
he is doing, so that he is fully
aware of the prospect of going to
jail or in prison, and so that he is
treated fairly by the prosecution. "

Argersinger v. Hamlin, 407 U.S., at 34.
The civil contemnor should not be
forced to stand alone against the combined powers of the complainant, the
judge and the prosecutor. Since some
states, including Maryland and New Jersey, provide for their State's attorney to
prosecute the civil contempt case, the
unlimited state prosecutorial resources
can be thrown against the civil contemnor. See Maryland Rules of Procedure,
Rule P4, § l(d) and Editor's note
thereto. !t therefore seems reasonable to
allow the civil contemnor to at least have
the assistance of counsel in the preparation of his defense. Without that minimal
guarantee the state is taking unnecessary
advantage of the civil contemnor.
The next section will focus on the right
to counsel for civil contemnors in Maryland.

HI. The Civil Contempt Proceeding
Under the Maryland Rules of
Procedure Brought to Enforce a
Previously Adjudicated Support Order
Violates the Alleged Contemnor's
Right to Counsel.
Under a former provision in Maryland
law, the legislature purported to limit the
power of the courts to inflict summary
punishment for contempt. Md. Ann.
Code Art. 26, § 34 (1973). This Section
4 was of questionable validity because of
judicial decisions holding that the power
to punish summarily for contempt was
inherent in a court of record and was not
subject to legislative limitation. See
Robinson v. State, 19 Md. App. 20, 308
A. 2d 712 (1973). !twas recognized that

it would have been unconstitutional for

the legislature to remove from the courts
their inherent contempt powers. Baltimore Radio Show v. State, 193 Md.
300,57 A. 2d 697 (1948), cert. denied,
388 U.S. 912 (1950). The current contempt of court provision, Md. Ann. Code
Courts and Judicial Proceeding Act §
1-202 (a), merely notes that "[a] court
may exercise the power to punish for
contempt...in the manner described in
the Maryland Rules.... " The old language
was removed, and the development of
the law of contempt is left to the courts.
The statute has been brought into conformity with the actual state of the law.
Adkins, Code Revision in Maryland: The
Courts and Judicial Proceedings Article,
34 Md. L. Rev. 7, 13 (1974).
Coercive imprisonment is a powerful
judicial tool. Its use in Maryland is governed only by court decisions, and its
application is guided by the Maryland
Rules of Procedure, Rule P. In relation to
the present inquiry in civil contempts
brought to enforce a prior support order,
some other applicable rules are Maryland Rules of Procedure, Rules 636, 685
and 719. Within this general framework
analysis can begin.
As stated, the judiciary has a powerful
tool in which it may coercively enforce
court orders. The courts should determine prior to trial just what the nature of
contempts proceedings are. Hare v.
Hare, 21 Md. App. 71, 318 A. 2d 234
(1974). Contempts are classified into
two categories, which are: (1) direct or
constructive, and (2) civil or criminal.
Md. Rules of Procedure, Rule P, §§ 2, 3,
4. The contempts are not mutually exclusive, and overlapping may result. Roll
v. State, 15 Md. App. 31, 288 A. 2d 605,
614 (1972). The line of distinction between civil and criminal contempt is
often indistinct, and often the same acts
or omissions may constitute both or, at
least, embrace aspects of both. Roll v.
State, supra, 288 A. 2d, at 621; State v.
Roll, 267 Md. 714, 298 A. 2d 867, at
876. In spite of the verbiage that is used
to designate contempt proceedings, they
are neither wholly civil nor criminal.
Grohman v. State, 258 Md. 552, 267 A.
2d 193, 195 (1970). But, it is generally
agreed that if any part of a contempt sentence is punishment, then the contempt

must be classified as a criminal one. Roll
v. State, supra, 288 A. 2d, at 621; State
v. Roll, supra, 298 A. 2d, at 876. If the
contempt is willful, then it should be classified as a criminal one. State v. Roll,
supra, 298 A. 2d, at 877. (As to definition of "willful," see Ewell v. State, 207
Md. 288,299, 114 A. 2d66, 72 (1955).)
The idea apparent from the complex of
rules demonstrated above is that one
needs a counselor to help him figure
them out.
A jail sentence for civil contempt will
be suspended if one purges himself. But,
the imprisonment may be avoided altogether if the civil contemnor shows
that he has neither the money nor the
ability to pay. McDaniel v. McDaniel,
256 Md. 684,262 A. 2d 52,55 (1970).
This interpretation of Md. Rule 636 dealing with the enforcement of orders by
contempt refines and limits the court's
power to charge one with contempt.
But, the problem remains as to how effectively one charged with contempt can
communicate his situation with the
judge. As such, the simple solution lies in
affording the contemnor the right to
counsel.
The typical situation involved in the
violation of a support decree isthe case
of husband or paramour who neglects to
pay child support. One case interpreting
Md. Rule PI has said that the fact that a
husband is in contempt will not prevent
his litigating his substantial rights in connection with which the contempt was
committed. Rethorst v. Rethorst, 214
Md. 1, 133 A. 2d 101 (1957). The procedure to be followed by courts is generally regulated by Md. Rule P4, § b dealing with the notice to defendant. One
case interpreting this rule has stated that
courts must observe the rights of defendants, and such rights include those
within the amorphous bundle called
"due process of law." Roll v. State,
supra, 288 A. 2d, at 617. When such
notice to defendant is issued, the court
shall allow a reasonable time for the preparation of one's defense and the essential facts constituting the contempt
charge. Reamer v. Reamer, 246 Md.
532, 229 A. 2d 74, 76 (1967).
In the preparation of his deffense, the
alleged contemnor should have the assistance of counsel. Otherwise, it would
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seem that the alleged contemnor could
hardly meet his burden of proof. In violation of support orders, it is generally recognized that in the proceedings instituted to coerce payment of the ordered
sums the burden is upon the alleged contemnor to prove his inability to comply
with the order. 53 A. L. R. 2d 591. Since
inability to pay is a complete defense, it is
very important for the alleged contemnor to plan his defense adequately. The
best way to plan a defense, however, is
with the able assistance of an attomey,
who would best know how to present
the case to the judge and how to arrange
an equitable solution with the State's Attomey.
If the contemnor is indigent, then it
does not seem possible for him to
employ effective counsel. And, the fact
that he may be indigent does not insure
that he can convince the judge of his inability to pay. Coercive imprisonment is
remedial, of course, only when the defendant is able to comply. Maggio v.
Zeitz, 333 U.S. 56, 76 (1948). And, as
the Supreme Court said, " ... to jail one
for a contempt for omitting an act he is
powerless to perform ... would ... make
the proceeding purely punitive, to describe it charitably." 333 U.S., at 72.
This is true because imprisoning a defendant incapable of performance cannot possibly cause him to take action to
benefit the complainant.

The Maryland Rules of Procedure,
Rule P4, § a, allows the institution of
constructive contempts by "the court on
its own motion, by the State's attomey
or by any person having actual knowledge of the alleged contempt." After the
proceeding is instituted, the defendant is
issued a show cause order requiring him
to show cause why he should not be held
in contempt. Md. Rule P4, § b. It is clear
that simply citing the defendant to sholN
cause why he should not be held in contempt is not the equivalent of adjudicating him in contempt. Gatuso v. Gatuso,
16 Md. App. 632,299 A. 2d 113, 115
(1973). The court may, also, appoint the
State's Attorney or any other member of
the Bar to prosecute the case. State v.
Roll, supra, 298 A. 2d, at 878. So many
of these procedures partake of the nature of a criminal proceeding that it
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seems illusory to call the action a "civil"
contempt. Courts should be more concemed with the constitutional rights of
defendants than they are with mere
forms or labels attached to proceedings.
The Argersinger ruling should be extended to the case of a civil contemnor

since such action has many of the attributes of a criminal action, except for the
name civil. The only problem would
seem to be statutory authority for the
appointment of counsel in Maryland.
The next issue of THE FORUM will pose
such a solution.
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